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[Summary] During the ﬁrst decade after markets became the major mechanisms 
of economic coordination in China and the area of the former Soviet Union (FSUA), 
corruption was perceived to increase in both. At the same time China experienced rapid 
growth while most countries in FSUA experienced steep declines. In the paper I argue 
that this difference is difﬁcult to explain within an n-country, cross-section econometric 
framework. Instead a case-oriented approach with more institutional speciﬁcation  is 
chosen. In particular, the role of the former normative and institutional framework 
of central planning is explored. The paper describes some of the explanations of 
corruption as it occurred under central planning, including its limitations and how 
they may be linked to (negative or positive) growth mechanisms. In addition the post-
transition data on corruption and growth are linked to major political characteristics at 
the point of transition.   
Jens Christopher Andvig
Corruption in China and 
Russia compared
Different legacies of central planning
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 Corruption in China and Russia compared:  Different legacies of 
central planning 
 
               1.  Introduction 
  
Corruption is a central issue in both the policy and research agendas of the countries 
making a transition from centrally planned to capitalist market economies. The 
population in most former European socialist countries and the whole former Soviet 
Union Area perceived that the transition from a centrally planned economy was 
accompanied by a large increase in corruption.1 China and Vietnam apparently have 
also gone through a period early in their transitions when corruption was perceived to 
increase in dramatic ways.2  
 
Why this increase in perceived corruption? Corruption implies transactions that break 
some prevailing rules or norms. Transitions represented massive changes in such 
rules. When individuals report increases in corruption, was their frame of reference 
the new or the old rules?  Or did the juxtaposition of the relevant old and new rules 
create contradictions that made it sometimes impossible not to break one set, and  
feasible for agents to break both?  
 
In the following I will discuss some of the research that focuses on the corruption-
growth (or production declines) nexuses in the transition countries3 of the former 
Soviet Union (the FSU countries), the former centrally planned or labor-managed 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe, and  the poorer, but also formerly centrally 
planned countries like China and Vietnam. Most attention will be given to Russia and 
China, however. China and Russia differ in that although both experienced extensive 
expansion of the legal use of market mechanisms, the communist party lost power in 
Russia but not in China. I will emphasize explanations that tie the transition forms of 
                                                 
1 As reported in Rose (2002) when asked “By comparison with the former communist regime, would 
you say that the level of corruption and taking bribes has increased?”,  a large majority of respondents 
in all the countries with the partial exception of  Poland  answered it in the affirmative. In Poland only 
58% answered that it had increased while 28 %, considered corruption unchanged.  
2 Cf.  the title of  Johnston and Hao (1995), “China’s surge of corruption”.  
3 I use the standard term ‘transition’ since it has become the standard although it has the undesirable 
connotation to suggest that all countries would move to the same  economic and political system.  So 
far, the actual outcomes may be quite different, and some very unpleasant. Reed’s (1996) term ‘ 
transformation’ might be better, but in any case its evident that we are considering major shifts in the 
economic-political system. 
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corruption and growth experiences to the properties of the old planned economies. I 
try to avoid simplistic explanations that view present day corruption as merely a carry 
over of old corrupt practices, however; rather I show how the new institutions created 
corrupt opportunities by destroying some of the check and balances of the old 
planning system.  
 
Being  considered an historical loser, economists and other social scientists are shying 
away from the socialist economic system, so many aspects of  it are already more 
quickly forgotten and less well understood than the passage of time by itself would 
explain. The strong normative beliefs at present in the efficiency and desirability of   
market devices have made it difficult to understand the hold of normative systems that 
argued the opposite, and the  normative tensions that arose when it was to be 
discarded. I argue that this tension was significant for the rise of perceived  
corruption, but may also have had some impact on the actual occurrence of  both 
corruption and embezzlement in the early transition years. Moreover, the normative  
dislike of the system may  have contributed to an underestimating of its post-
transition positive (in the epistemological sense) effects. For example, it is difficult to 
understand the production decline in the FSU countries without understanding the 
economic roles in of the Communist Party in a planned economy. It is difficult to 
understand the decline in effective taxation and the rate of corruption in the tax 
administrations of the transition economies without  understanding  the different and 
subservient roles of prices in the planning system compared to in a market economy, 
and so on.  
 
Our  focus is somewhat  controversial. Treisman (2003) argues that factors that have 
nothing to do either with the specifics of the planning system or the characteristics of 
the transitions explain most of the present perceived corruption levels in the former 
socialist countries in Europe and Central Asia. Most of the dramatic changes there 
might simply be considered some eye-catching, institutional noise. The controversy 
here raises the issue of the explanatory power of  n-country, cross-section 
econometrics  of governance.  
 
 At least since the publication of Mauro (1995) this approach has dominated empirical 
corruption research in economics. In addition to its methodological appeal it made 
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strong impact by bringing corruption issues into the economic growth field at a time 
when growth studies again become fashionable. In particular he studied the effects of 
corruption on growth rates  Since then n-country econometric studies of  the effects of 
corruption on GDP levels and  growth rates ( and the effects of GDP levels on 
corruption rates)  have been  prominent  in corruption research.  One reason for 
bringing together the transition countries in one study is to highlight some 
inconsistencies between their experiences and the generally strong statistical 
relationship between growth and corruption. All of these countries experienced 
massive changes in their information, decision-making, and motivation structures as 
they made a transition away from central planning.4 However, these changes were 
accompanied by widely diverging growth experiences. One would expect economic 
system changes of this size to have an impact on both corruption and growth, but why 
in such different directions?5 
 
In the context of Mauro’s n-country, cross-section econometric result that corruption  
has a negative impact on growth,  the China and Vietnam cases appear paradoxical. 
They have to be explained either as random aberrations of a common tendency for 
corruption to have a negative impact on growth, or to be explained by bringing in 
other variables into the growth-corruption equation.  Corruption may, for example, act 
as a negative drag on what would have been an even stronger underlying growth-
inducing constellation of  the values of the explanatory variables. For example, the 
low degree of industrialization (their low GDP-levels per capita) in the case of China 
and Vietnam compared to the former Soviet Union area at the onset of their shifts 
towards market economy made larger scope for growth whatever the incidence of 
corruption.  But how come then  that  the rate of decline  in the FSU countries was 
negatively correlated to  their initial GDP  levels  at the starting points of their  
transitions (Andvig, 2002)? Given the wide variation in the rates of change in GDP, is 
                                                 
4 Sachs et al (2000)  brings together the FSU and China-Vietnam experiences for similar reasons and  
also to note the circumscribed role (so far)  for formal modeling when it comes to the key issues. They  
observe “the formal models are too simple to capture the complexity of  institutional changes. The core 
of transition is a large-scale shift of constitutional rules…”   
5 According to World Bank Development Indicators 2005 while the average growth rate in China 
(GDP) in the period 1990-2003 was 9.6% and for Vietnam 7.5 % for the FSU –countries it ranged 
between 1.0% (Estonia) to – 5.9% (Moldovia). In Russia it was – 1.8%. In the period China had gone 
through the first part of its transition, its growth rate (1980-1990) was 10.3 % while in the first phase  
of the  transition of the FSU countries the steepest decline for each country ranged between  –11.0% 
(Uzbekistan 1992) and  -52.3% (Armenia, 1992). See Havrylyshyn et al., 1999.   
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it really reasonable to conclude that the corruption-GDP nexus is affected throughout 
the region by the same variables working additively in the same equations?  Instead, 
should one not look for different mechanisms –one that ties corruption and production 
decline in the FSU case and one that ties growth and corruption in the China –
Vietnam case? Or should one de-link the explanations of corruption from the 
explanations for growth? These are some of the questions that naturally arise for 
corruption research when the different transition experiences from central planning 
are brought together in a multiple case study setting  (Ragin, 2000).  
 
After a brief discussion of  corruption definitions applicable in the context of 
transition and extensive rule change, I  present a  set of well-known general  features 
of the centrally planned economies relevant for the arise of corruption within that 
system as well as for the arise of new forms of corruption during their transitions and 
their growth experiences. Then I outline what I consider the major explanations of  
corruption specific to a planned economy that also have some obvious implications 
for growth. This is followed by an overview of some general characteristics of  the 
initial transition stage including what I consider to be  the major differences between 
China (Vietnam) and the FSU countries. Finally I present a few of the models and  
empirical analyses of  that have been tailor-made for transition conditions. Here I am 
very selective. The literature is vast. In particular, I have neglected a large amount of 
empirical, quantitative information about corruption and governance in the FSU and 
ex-socialist European countries that has been collected by the World Bank and 
elsewhere since I have been unable to fit it into the theoretical pictures drawn here 
The discussion in the following is explorative and biased towards theory that links 
economic growth (or contraction) and corruption. 
 
The thrust of the analysis of corruption-growth nexuses as they evolve during 
transitions may be summed up by the metaphor of a ski-jump.  I try to consider three 
different, but interlocked dynamic sub-systems: the in-run, the jump and the flight. 
The final outcome, the length (the post-transition conditions), hinges upon the 
performance in all three sub-systems.   
 
              2 .  Background characteristics of China and the FSU countries 
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 Before proceeding, I outline a few striking characteristics of China and Russia– most 
of them common knowledge-- that are most relevant for discussing the forms, causes 
and consequences of corruption prior to and during the transition.6 Because the focus 
of my analysis is the transition, the ideal comparison  would be between China  in 
1978-79 and  FSU area (FSUA) or Russia in 1990-92.    
Structural features: At the outset of the transition that increased the scope for 
market transactions the formal economic structures of China and the FSUA were quite 
similar -- based on central planning and public ownership of capital. However, when 
major changes began in China in around 1979, the planned economy had lasted only 
for one generation (about 25 years), while in the USSR the central planning structure 
had been basically unchanged for two generations in most of the country when change 
set in there around 1990. 
 
When it began to reform, China was basically a poor, agriculturally based economy 
while most of the USSR was a middle-income (over-) industrialized economy. In 
1980 was about 75% of the Chinese population employed in agriculture while only 
about 15% of the population of the present Russian Federation worked in agriculture 
in 1990. (calculated from WTO NEWS: 2000 Press Releases/167_6). This had obvious 
implication for both the growth potential of the state and for the forms and location of 
potential corruption.7  In 1980 the agricultural value added per worker in China was at 
the level of Chad, and it still is only 10% of the corresponding value in Russia. 
Somewhat less than half of the Chinese and somewhat less than a quarter of   the 
Russian lived below the international poverty line at $2 a day at the turn of the 
millennium (World Development 2004, different tables). This difference was even 
more pronounced when their transitions began. Naturally, the level of GDP per capita 
                                                 
6 The presentation of data will be somewhat impressionistic since it suffices for our explorative 
purposes.. For example, sometimes data from other parts of the FSUA areas than  Russia will be 
brought in, sometimes only Russian data,  a few times even data  from  some former socialist countries 
that did not belong to either.  The treatment here is not symmetrical since differences across China’s 
regions are rarely presented. While for example the difference of regional growth rates in China are 
considerable it is interesting that they dwindle when compared to the different country outcomes of 
countries that formerly belonged to the same Soviet Union. 
7 While the long–run growth potential in China should be much higher, that potential should not be 
used in any direct way in explaining the difference in  short-run growth rates between the two areas. As 
pointed out in Andvig (2002) inside the FSU and East European area the rate of GDP declines was 
negatively correlated with initial GDP levels. 
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of  China in 1980 was  much lower than for Russia in 1990.8 However, at the outset of 
the transition the income distribution in China was at about as even as Russia.9  
 
In addition to the economic structures a number of inherited cultural codes of conduct 
transferable across economic systems may be of significance. Historically established 
corruption rates are likely to have an impact. Both Russia and China are known to 
have had highly corrupt public administrations going back several centuries before the 
establishment of a socialist structure.10  
 
 
3. Corruption definitions and systemic change 
 
Many, somewhat different, definitions of  corruption are current in the literature. The 
one most frequently used one is ascribed to Nye (1967: 416) and defines corruption as 
“behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status 
gains.” Interpreted literally this definition is too wide for most purposes, since almost 
every official would then behave corruptly. A more reasonable interpretation would 
be it to cover serious acts of bribing and extortion at its core, and depending on the 
context, to include various types of private-regarding activities at its edges. I have few 
objections to the standard definition interpreted this way, but I have found the 
following one – based on Rose Ackerman (1978: 6-7) somewhat more precise and 
useful for my purposes:  
 
- An act is commercially corrupt if a member of an organization uses his 
position, his rights to make decisions, his access to information, or other resources of 
the organization, to the advantage of a third party and thereby receives money or other 
economically valuable goods or services where either the payment itself or the services 
provided are illegal and/or against the organization's own aims or rules.  
                                                 
8 Estimated in  2000$, GDP per capita for China in 1980 was 173 $ while GDP for Russia in 1990 was 
2583$ (www.ers.usda.gov/data/macroeconomics/HistoricalRealPerCapitaIncomeValues.xls). 
9 The Gini coefficient (for income) was 27.8 for the Soviet Union in 1989,(Shorrocks, 1999) and 25.7 
in China in 1984 (Xu and Zou, 2000). In 1984 the transition had already started in China so the income 
distribution in 1979 was probably even more even than in 1984.  
10 Ni and Van (2004) estimated that the higher bureaucracy’s corrupt income in the Ming and Qing 
dynasties was more than twenty times their official income. They argue that corruption was a major 
factor behind China’s technological stagnation after 1300.  
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- If the act is mainly motivated by the intangible valuables received, is given by 
the member serving the interests of friends or family, or his own standing in family-
friendship networks, it is an act of family-friendship corruption.11  
- An act represents embezzlement if a member of an organization uses his rights 
to make decisions, his labor time, his access to information or some tangible assets of 
the organization to his own economic advantage, eventually to the advantage of some 
other members of the organization, in ways that are either illegal or against the 
organization's own aims or rules. Embezzlement might also be motivated to achieve the 
individual’s standing in family-friendship networks 
 
Regarding this set of definition we observe that corrupt transactions are not a set of 
actions that may be observed as such. Corruption has to be related to a set of rules about  
the proper procedures for  transactions; when a person acts corruptly,  a transactional 
mode (Andvig, 2006) is broken. Both family-friendship and commercial corruption 
imply a transaction between at least two actors, one of whom has to be a non-member 
of the organization. In the case of regular, commercial corruption, there is an illegal or 
illegitimate expansion of market transactions into the fields of bureaucratic or political  
fields of transacting.  A major question is whether the large expansion of the legal scope 
for market transactions that is a necessary consequence of  the transition away from 
central planning, may have  induced  (or contained) the scope for illegal market 
transactions such as commercial corruption. It is obvious, but rarely made clear, that 
since the rules for the proper dividing lines between bureaucratic and market 
transactions change during the process, so will the scope of what should be considered 
corrupt.  
 
Embezzlement, on the other hand, may be performed by a single insider, but large scale 
embezzlement normally involves several people.  More importantly, the rules broken 
are different. While corruption in the narrow sense raises the question of the proper way 
of making transactions, embezzlement challenges the property rights of the 
organization, including the proper internal allocation of the decision-making rights. In 
the case of the FSU-countries and the other formerly centrally planned countries in 
Europe (FCPE-countries for short) massive changes in the rules and principles for 
determining property rights were taking place. What may be considered legal 
privatization from the point of view of the new norms may be considered embezzlement 
                                                 
11 This form of corruption may often be considered as too wide, and for many purposes it would be 
misleading. Since an important part of the empirical research into corruption in the centrally planned 
economies has focused on this form (called blat in Russia and guanxi in China), the commercial form 
may define corruption too narrowly, however.  
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of the people’s property from the point of view  of the old norms  The question then 
reappears:  Does massive legal transfers of ownership rights – according to the new 
laws - into private hands induce (or contain) illegal or illegitimate transfer of assets, 
i.e. embezzlement also according to those new laws? Even if we are uninterested in 
the old system as such, it  leaves marks on the new one.  If nothing else, the former 
norms may be held by the older people and influence the share of present transactions 
they will perceive as corrupt and the share of present private property they will 
consider legitimate.12  
 
And most of present data on corruption are data on perceptions. Perceptions may have 
a direct impact on behavior, as shown for Ukraine in  Cábelková (2001), but old 
norms and socialist law  also have impact along other  routes.  It takes time to develop 
a consistent set of laws. Direct legal inconsistencies are part of the transition picture 
which give scope for corruption and embezzlement. Even if the laws have become 
clear, the existence of contradictory norms may also affect behavior, for example by 
reducing the ethical costs of their violation.  
 
The precise mechanisms may prove difficult to pin-point: The ethical costs may go 
down because people did not believe in socialist laws and, hence, will not believe in 
any law including the new market-framing ones. Conversely, the agents may believe 
in socialist laws, in particular, but also believe in the value of being law-abiding, in 
general. That being the case, the costs of abiding by the market-framing laws will go 
down. Similarly, for those who believe in socialist law and institutions, if legitimate 
authorities change the economic rules, these people will believe in them too and the 
ethical costs of violating them will remain high.  
 
                                                 
12 Based on a survey with 2600 respondents from Ukraine, Cábelková (2001) in an important paper 
studies the interaction between their corruption experiences and corruption perceptions. One of her 
observations is that older people perceive state institutions to be more corrupt at the same time as they 
appear less willing to bribe.  This might, of course, be explained as normal characteristics of age since 
older people engage in fewer economic transactions (including corrupt ones) and are also normally 
more pessimistic. But when we regard the at times dramatic difference in attitudes towards the (mostly) 
legal early market organizations, the cooperatives, between the different age groups in the Soviet 
Union as reported in different polls around 1990 (see Jones and Moskoff  (1991): 94 – 109) it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that some forms of legal expansions of market transactions will also be 
considered corrupt.       
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Whatever the precise mechanisms were,  the old system’s formal norms and their 
cumulated violations under the old regime should be understood when trying to 
explain the corruption and embezzlement taking place during the transitions in their 
interaction with their growth experiences, both in post-socialist and post-communist 
transitional states.13   
 
 
4. General characteristics of central planning and the corruption 
experiences of the transitions 
 
Several features of the socialist system were important not only for the eventual rise 
of corruption inside the planned economies, but also as determinants for post – 
transition corruption. This applies for its rules of ownership, the economic roles of the 
ruling party, its demarcation of the proper areas for market versus bureaucratic 
transactions, its ethics of governance and income distribution, the missing roles of 
prices, its incentive structure, and so on. They are all important features of the system 
that made it differ from the market-led systems. They all had important consequences 
for the growth experiences and/or the corruption perceived and realized in the systems 
that followed. The main features were shared by all post-Communist states but were 
more clearly articulated in the Soviet Union than in China.  
 
Central planning as an economic bureaucracy.  A basic characteristic of the socialist 
economies is that they were organized as a single, but complex public hierarchy.   
Unlike standard public bureaucracies the main thing shuffled across offices (the 
enterprises) were not messages, but real goods and services. Like a standard bureaucracy 
there were no hard price charges as long as transactions were internal to the bureaucracy. 
The prices attached to them were mainly accounting devices to keep track of what the 
offices were doing, making it possible to compare the reports from different offices, 
                                                 
13The term ‘post-socialist’ will be used about economic systems that have moved away from central 
planning as the leading ideal of economic coordination while the term  ‘post-communist’  will be 
applied to the post-socialist countries where the communist parties have lost power. Hence post 
communist as defined here is strictly speaking  a sub-class of post-socialist regimes. When used 
together post- socialist will also mean those post-socialist countries that are not post-communist. Note 
that communist here is following the traditional Cold War rhetoric. Within the socialist tradition 
communist designated a  community where the known hierarchic, market and family transactions all 
have withered away. Only friendship, ‘comradely’  relations  remain. Given the focus on communist 
party here the meaning of ‘communist’  should be unambiguous in our context.  
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aggregate the reports to consistent ones at the higher levels, and so on. The prices were 
not very important for their behavior. Only when the goods left the bureaucracy and 
went to the private consumers were real price charges made. Labor was the only item on 
the bureaucracy’s ledger that represented a real cost.  
 
At the higher levels the central problem was to coordinate the different offices so that 
their plans for delivery and procurement meshed. In order to do this, the specification of 
its transaction technology, which office to communicate with whom, was exceptionally 
important so that the higher levels were not overwhelmed with information. In theory the 
economy was coordinated by a production and delivery plan. In practice, they were more 
like multilateral bartering systems where the subordinate offices had to do a considerable 
amount of searching themselves. The lack of price charges implied that most of the 
search costs had to be born by the office which needed to acquire the good.  There was 
an excess demand for most goods so only agents that wanted to acquire goods were 
willing to carry the search costs.  The specification of the transaction technology reduced 
the search costs, however. Coordinating sectors, while not dealing in planning in any 
strict sense, had an important role by actively reducing the large search costs involved.14  
  
Hicks' (1969:12-13) view that the long-run equilibria of public bureaucracies are at low - 
but essentially stable - activity levels is, I believe, widely shared. However, he also 
pointed out that if society needs to accomplish some tasks extraordinarily quickly, such 
as wars or large rescue operations, public organizations are needed. This suggests that 
public organizations, like a centrally planned economy, may operate at widely different 
activity levels. An important reason is that transactions inside a bureaucracy have low 
monetary costs, they are almost free, but at the same time forced. If superiors in a line 
demand hard efforts they are entitled to get it, if they make few demands, subordinates 
are not obliged to work hard either. Regarding agents at the same level, free riding is 
certainly a possibility, but difficult to perform if everyone else is working hard. To 
choose the same effort levels as the other agents doing the same task, is a more likely 
                                                 
    14 A more appropriate starting point for a positive theory of material allocation inside a CPE  than the formal planning 
models could be some version of Diamond's (1982) coconut island. Here we could let the central planners try to speed up 
production by limiting the trading space - and thereby reduce searching time at the "market". Or, we could let them force 
prospective climbers up into the higher trees at the gun point and thereby reduce the externality involved. In order to fit 
the case better a number of modifications are, of course, necessary. 
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strategy (Andvig and Moene, 1993). In this way the transaction technology of public 
organizations functions much like an assembly line (Akerlof, 1976). If we combine the 
two characteristics, the implication is that the activity level in a bureaucracy may be 
extremely sensitive to the activity levels chosen at the higher levels. If the higher levels 
choose to increase their activity they will experience an activity multiplier through 
feedbacks from the lower levels. The multiplier should also work in a downwards 
direction if the higher levels slacken. Traditionally the employees are receiving fixed 
wages and have at least semi-tenured contracts which only allow for soft economic 
incentives associated with the specific tasks. Ideally this may keep a task orientation15 
 
Bureaucracies are, however, not only arenas for human task solving, they are also 
hierarchies where superiors rule, and where wages and working conditions at the top are 
also superior to those further down. The desire for promotion – that is, moving up in the 
hierarchical ladder - becomes the hard economic incentive. It is comparable in strength 
to the profit motive among owners of capital, and is often reinforced by the prospect of 
having increased influence on solving the tasks facing the organization. The only way to 
become rich and widely respected is to move up the hierarchical ladder. 
 
Hence, the key to power in any bureaucracy is to gain control of the employment 
function: the ability to employ and fire, to promote and demote the employees of the 
organization.16 How the probability of promotion is related to the agents’ task solving 
behavior is a key factor in determining the activity levels in public bureaucracies.  If 
promotions are granted to officials who work harder than the average, a rat race 
(Akerlof, 1976) may arise.  On the other hand, if an official enters an organization 
accustomed to low levels of activity, he may work at a slow pace without becoming 
identified as lazy. If he starts out in this situation as an energetic person and tries to 
initiate new activity, he may not accomplish much. Other agents are accustomed to their 
low speed. The joint efforts usually required to improve performance will not be 
                                                 
15 Particularly in private bureaucracies short-term wage contracts and/or piece-rates have been rather 
frequently used, but mainly for simpler task. Particularly during the Stalin-period piece rates for 
manual labour was also common in the Soviet Union. Again more recently, it has become popular to 
try to apply harder economic incentives associated with more complex tasks, or “projects”. 
16 The historically maybe most clear-cut and famous case was Stalin’s takeover of the control of the 
Communist Party in the 1920s through his control of the employment function of the  party employees, 
and given  their increasing numbers among  the representatives at Party congresses, he thereby also 
acquired control of the party itself.   
 13
forthcoming.  Also because of spillover effects in the promotion system, the optimal 
activity level chosen by a single bureaucrat depends upon the activity levels adopted by 
the bureaucrats with whom he is in regular communication.17  
 
The mechanisms for promotion, hiring and firing were also important in facilitating 
coordination. They represent an enormous saving in the information costs of steering 
compared with the physical planning of all inputs and outputs  which was the formal 
procedures of central planning systems. Although management positions in the Soviet 
Union and China were numerous, the number of significant actions that should be 
coordinated through the planning process was much larger. It was much easier to control 
individuals through personnel policies than to control all their actions through extensive 
formal control systems. This explains why the Nomenklatura system became so 
important in the centrally planned economies, and why the communist party's control of 
hiring policies was so important. 
 
The role of the communist party   As emphasized by  Kornai ( Kornai 1992:361)  the  
Communist Party and its ideology is the key to understand the workings of the CPEs. 
                                                 
17Analytically the situation is identical to several multiple equilibrium models of corruption. If the 
principal is not lazy, organizations may control for go-slow strategies, but as pointed out in a model (of 
corruption) by Lui (1986), control becomes more difficult as the fraction of go-slow bureaucrats increases. 
Furthermore, a lazy official will have a lower propensity to report others as lazy. The relative gain of going 
slow increases. The model introduces overlapping generations, with officials living in two periods. A 
higher fraction of generations living at the end of their working life tend to be lazy. Moreover, being caught 
lazy by a lazy superior should  normally result in lower effective punishment than when caught by a 
hardworking one (Andvig & Moene (1990)). If the population of officials are - on average - hardworking, 
it does not pay to be lazy. If they are lazy, it is better to follow the crowd. If  agents obey social norms, and 
the  norms themselves are strongly influenced by beliefs about  average behavior in the group,  behavior 
will still also cluster around different activity levels (Schlicht ,1981).  
What may cause the switch between the equilibria?  Here the hierarchical character of the organizations is 
important. We have argued that the bureaucrats' beliefs about what the others are doing may have strong 
impact on their own behavior. These again will be strongly influenced by the top leadership's behaviour 
and attitudes, since these normally are public knowledge. Naturally, these are fast moving variables. The 
same applies for definite changes in ideology which may, for example, influence the perceived promotion 
criteria for most members of the organization.  
Public threats of harsher punishment for laziness, etc., may work in the same way - if they are credible. If 
internalised, ideology has the additional advantage that it can deliver certain punishment, even in the case 
when laziness cannot be discovered by others. Ideology, which is believed in, makes for "committed" 
officials (Frank, 1988). Leadership is also important in two ways. Their behavior is in some degree public 
knowledge, and news about shifts in leadership style with its implications for promotion criteria may travel 
fast. Leadership is also important along slower routes. The expected disutility for a lazy official meeting a 
superior who is working hard, is likely to be higher than meeting a hard worker at the same level. On 
average, a superior is also likely to meet more people than other officials. So, a few hardworking leaders 
may have fairly strong effects on the behavior of individuals directly, through what we have called the 
transaction technology. These direct interactions with inferiors in task solving situations give also leaders 
important information of the inferiors’ capabilities 
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Its economic role has rarely been subject to precise economic analysis, however.18 It 
combined the economic roles of entrepreneurship, planning and capital markets with 
the political functions of security, repression and participation.  By determining the 
composition and changes of the leadership groups of the enterprises, it acted as the 
active owner and as capital market. By being formally outside the economic 
organizations, the party could push for results and urge changes in the composition of 
industries. Hence, it had to act somewhat like an entrepreneur. Since the cadres were 
interlinked in a separate hierarchy, their interaction was a key lever in determining the 
economic growth rates in the CPEs.  The outcome in that respect has been mixed, but 
by emphasizing growth related promotion criteria and a sufficient number of 
promotions, the system appears capable of achieving fairly high growth rates, as 
shown recently by China and Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in part of the Stalinist 
period.  A certain dedication and belief in the system is probably also important in order 
to keep the system in high-activity equilibrium.19 
 
In any bureaucracy the major monitors of any difficult-to-prove corrupt transaction are 
other members of the same bureaucracy. Although the security police played an 
important role in monitoring the cadres, the key monitors were the communist party 
cadres themselves. Whether a corrupt transaction was discovered, exposed, and punished 
hinged upon other cadres’ behavior. The whole party of a country or some   regional 
partitions of it, could move towards active propagation of corruption, lenience, or active 
monitoring and effective punishment. Moreover, given their monitoring and directing 
role with respect to the economic bureaucracy, the cadres’ behavior had economy-wide 
                                                 
18 The workings of the communist parties have attracted more attention among sociologists and 
political scientists than economists despite their important economic role. An interesting exception is 
Lazarev (2004), but he is unable to answer the question of why the leadership of  such  organizations 
have earned so modest economic returns if the organization is created for  maximizing the economic 
returns of the leadership, as he argues it did. 
19 This emphasis on bureaucratic drive and the communist party role in it represents , of course, an 
exaggeration of  the role of  the motivational forces in the bureaucracies,  at the expense of  an 
emphasis on coordination  issues, and the importance of market incentives. The  high transaction costs 
involved when introducing genuine innovations were clearly an Achilles heel of the system. A 
somewhat more extensive elaboration of the Soviet experience is presented in Andvig (2002). From the 
perspective outlined here, the Chinese (and Vietnam) experience of  increased reliance on market 
forces may be considered as a way to let the party cadres receive growth related promotion incentives, 
while the accepted interpretation is to consider the countries as moving towards  regular market 
economies, and where  it is the release of market forces that generate the growth.  In a more general 
context Jones and Olken (2005) have shown that shifts of national leaders may have significant impact 
for national growth rates even for countries that have fewer centralized levers than a ruling Communist 
Party. 
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effects. Summing up: given the structure of the socialist economies, a key transmission 
mechanism linking growth and corruption experiences went through the Communist 
Party.20  
 
The Communist Party as a partly personalized network that criss-crossed practically all 
activities in the socialist countries was also of clear relevance both for how corrupt 
transactions became organized after the transition and for their frequency. 
 
The role of prices. In capitalist market economies prices have at least three functions 
(Johansen 1978: 55 - 59):  i) to aggregate different items for accounting ii) to allocate 
resources and iii) to generate income and income claims or debts  that give rise to strong 
incentives. In socialist economies prices were mainly serving the first and partly the 
second role. The third role was rather unimportant. It is that  role that makes the prices so 
important and hard facts  in market economies, however. The point of time when that 
shift occurred was crucial for the shift in the economic system. During the transition 
more important than the determination of  prices by anonymous markets forces (rather 
than by a price-fixing agency) emphasized in the transition literature as market 
‘liberalization’  was their hardening into a basis for the enterprises’ income and 
demand.  A price is hard if it determines the supplier’s command of other goods and 
services. The supplier as buyer is free to spend the income on any other good or 
service available on a market. Without sales, no income and no access to goods and 
services. In principle a price may be fixed and regulated and still be hard in this sense. 
If changed by administrative rules, it would in that case still have roughly the same 
effects on the supplying units demand for other goods as a similar change was the 
result of market prices. The distinction between hard and soft prices is important for 
the understanding of the central planning economies, their transition to market 
economies and the localization of corruption issues during that transition. Debts may 
also be hard or soft in the sense that it may have to be paid back in hard sales income 
or just be an accounting relationship. 
 
                                                 
20 From a different, political science perspective, Jowitt (1983) explicated the key role of the party , 
even making its actual behavior the defining characteristic of political corruption in the Soviet type of 
system. The Soviet elite became corrupt, Jowitt claimed,  when the party members’  informal practices 
rather than contributing to  the party’s formal goals and interests subverted  them, destroying its 
organizational integrity.    
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This implied that enterprises would not spend many resources in fighting taxes under a 
planning system, nor would they be strongly interested in increasing prices or fighting 
wage increases.21 Their positions as debtors or creditors of other enterprises were also of 
minor interest. During the transition process the role of prices changed everywhere, and 
the move from soft to hard prices was of great importance for the localization of corrupt 
transactions when the countries moved away from central planning. An inheritance of a 
different kind was that the relative price structure, even for the consumer goods, differed 
significantly from prices in the world market. This was most pronounced for the Soviet 
Union, but applied also for the other socialist countries, including China. The original 
difference in price structure was a source of extensive smuggling and corruption in the 
early years of the transition. 
 
The legal and norm structure Although many (in some countries most) citizens in the 
CPEs did not believe in the official socialist codes of ethics, the ethics come to play a 
role for both the actual and perceived corruption during the transition. Important here 
was the notion that all property which involved use of labor power should be publicly 
owned. Only a circumscribed set of market transactions was ethically acceptable. It was 
morally wrong for any member of the elite to be very rich in the sense of owning large 
properties even for her own consumption. Equally important was the idea that  
enterprises should be managed by the government and, in practice, be part of the 
government structure, not separated from it. Moreover the lines separating the political 
and government spheres were thin. This normative and legal structure could not simply 
be abandoned by administrative fiat during a transition. That is obvious in the case of 
social norms that almost by definition can not be manufactured freely (Elster, 1989: 125) 
but even old legal structures may also possess considerable inertia. At the very least, it 
takes time to make a new, consistent legal structure. These old structure may have an 
impact in different, sometimes complex ways: 
i) A norm supporting a type of action may survive directly into the new system 
which prescribes a new set of actions. The new set of norms that will underpin 
the legal reform, may not be accepted by the population, however. Then, if the 
                                                 
21 As shown in Harrison and Kim (2001) they will have some interest in higher prices, but their survival 
would not hinge upon their levls.  
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new legal prescriptions are followed, the public may perceive these transactions 
as corrupt if they are defined as such by the old norms.22  
ii) Old norms/legal practices may mix with new ones in ways that give scope for 
corruption. Of key importance here is when the norm combination ‘close- 
cooperation-between government regulators and enterprises-soft-budget 
income’ is not supplanted by the new ideal norm combination ‘arms-length 
relations between government regulators and enterprises-hard-enterprise 
income’, but rather with the combination ‘close cooperation between 
government regulators and enterprises- hard- enterprise income’.23   
iii) The old rules may be being believed in, but together with the new rules, give 
rise to norm dissonance and anomie. 
iv) More complex interaction between old and new norm systems may take place 
and be applied For example, suppose that action patterns a ,b and c were labeled 
by the old norm structure as inappropriate market transactions, but that a and b, 
but not c, are accepted in the new system. The former lack of acceptability of all 
three action patterns may lead agents to consider c to be appropriate as well  
because c is  seen as normatively equal to a and b.   
So far we have emphasized basic institutional characteristics of the planned 
economies that appear relevant for the growth-corruption nexus both inside and in the 
transition away from central planning. Let us end this section with the outline of a 
definite economic model that ties an important characteristic of central planning – the 
specialization of each output at as few plants as possible - with an explanation of 
production decline (and corruption) only valid for the early transition period:   
 
Rigidity of the input- output matching of the planning process and its consequences 
for the effects of corruption. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) focus on the strong 
technical complementarity  (simplified in a Leontiev technology) between industries 
and the specificity of the network structure between enterprises under central 
planning. It had vertical and horizontal dimensions. Looking at the vertical 
                                                 
22  Amore detailed exposition of these possibilities may bound  in Andvig (2006). 
23 Yao (2002) underlines this mix as the key to recent corruption in China: “Most of the Chinese 
economists…have  the correct observation that the cause of China’s current corruption problems is the 
lack of separation between business and government..”  In the oil industry   in Azerbaijan a similar mix 
was a key to that country’s corruption problem in the late 1990s (Andvig, 1999). SOCAR,  the state-
owned oil company acted at the same time as a Ministry of Energy and was likely to be the linchpin of 
corrupt transactions in the country. 
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dimension: a given product of enterprise n would need inputs only supplied by 
enterprise n- 1, that needed input only supplied by n –2, and so on until reaching the 
supplier of raw materials enterprise 1.  This technology structure of central planning 
was then inherited by the transitional market economy.  Under central planning the 
enterprises would normally reach binding agreements for delivery, but with weak 
market institutions these chains might easily unravel when the enterprises were free to 
contract with agents not linked to the chain. Blanchard and Kremer assume that under 
such conditions the suppliers were unable to sign a contract of delivery before goods 
were produced.  Hence each producer had to pay for her inputs before she 
(eventually) could earn any income. 
 
If any enterprise either withdraw its output due to new outside opportunities or 
refused to pay the preceding link, the chain would unravel.24 Withdrawal of output 
from producer chains during transitions may sometimes be motivated by contracting 
difficulties, but embezzlement of variable inputs or capital assets induced by outside 
markets opportunities was also possible. 
 
 Blanchard and Kremer also considered horizontal networks. Here an enterprise may 
need n inputs. If one did not materialize, it would produce nothing. Each supplier of 
inputs had an alternative use for it, but the alternative was not worth the same to each 
supplier. The enterprise would announce a take-it-or-leave-it price that was the same 
for each supplier. If the price was fixed too high, the enterprise would be unable to 
produce any net output. If the price was set too low,  that is so low that at least  one of 
the suppliers would not deliver at all, the enterprise would produce nothing with 
negative effects on the output of the supplying enterprises. During the transition at 
least some of the suppliers are likely to get better alternatives, increasing the 
likelihood of production decline in the interlocked state-enterprise system. Again, at 
least as long as these enterprises were state-owned, this withdrawal of supply, may be 
considered as embezzlement.  
 
                                                 
24We have seen that similar tendencies may also evolve under central planning in areas where the 
authorities were weak and the underground economy’s share in production substantial. A famous case 
happened in Uzbekistan where local units embezzled a large share of cotton harvest in the early 1980s 
(Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, Sept. 5, 1984).  
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Turning their model somewhat around, the suppliers may become the price-setters and 
we may move into the Shleifer-Vishny territory to be outlined in the next section.  
These prices may reflect bribes. If coordinated, they would adjust the bribe demand so 
that the enterprise may at least break even. If decentralized, their demands may 
exceed the enterprise’s ability to pay and the production may break down for that 
reason. Hence, a combination of Shleifer-Vishny decentralized corruption and 
Blanchard- Kremer centralized input-output mechanisms may together explain the 
stylized fact of strong production declines and steep corruption increases in most FSU 
countries. 
 
 
5. Corruption characteristics of the centrally planned economies 
 
How might the corruption experiences in the transition countries be linked to the 
corruption under central planning? There are several possibilities:  1) Corrupt 
behavior and situations may have just been directly transferred, 2) brakes that were 
present under central planning may have been lifted, 3) norms, laws or situations that 
contained or caused corruption then may cause or contain corruption when they are 
mixed with new conditions, or 4) there may be no links at all -  the pre-and post-
change mechanisms may be completely different. Unless the last possibility is 
dominant, corruption mechanisms under central planning are of obvious relevance for 
a study of corruption in post-socialist countries. 
 
 Only a few analyses of the specific corruption mechanisms of central planning have 
been formulated. A plausible reason for this situation is that at the time when the 
research interest in corruption increased, the interest in central planning faded. 
 
The most influential analysis of corruption under central planning  today is  Shleifer  
and Vishny ( 1992, 1993). They outlined a mechanism that could explain both how 
corruption was deeply ingrained (in their view) in the core of  central planning, but 
also  how likely modifications of the corruption mechanism during a transition could 
lead to negative growth rates  in the FSU countries, but not under central planning. 
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Corruption as a major method of allocating planned scarce goods and services. Their 
starting point was the all-embracing experience of shortages under central planning.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) explain it simply as caused by monopolistic behavior by 
the socialist industries. The ministry officials colluded with enterprise managers and 
became one decision-making unit.25  The authorities taxed away all profits. Hence, it 
made no sense to maximize profit.  Rather the ministry/enterprise maximized net 
bribe income.  The same bribe was paid by all customers, but as the bribe increased, 
the demand for the good or service in question decreased. Like a normal monopolist a 
ministry would play on the demand curve by restricting sales/production. Unlike a 
regular monopolist, however, a ministry would not worry about its cost function but 
about the official price of the goods it was obliged to deliver. The higher the official 
price was fixed, the lower would the net bribe income be. If a few customers were 
able to acquire the good through queuing, regular lobbying, etc. and not by bribes, it 
would not change the model in any important way.  To make sense, they would have 
to net out all inter-enterprise transactions and look at the whole economic apparatus as 
it confronted the final (private) consumers. 
 
What happens in a transition without privatization, when the official, controlled prices 
are increased in order to relieve the shortages? The outcome would be as suggested: 
reduced output supply, hence increased shortages despite an increase in the market 
price although it now included reduced net bribes. The negative supply response was 
working through the reduction in net bribes. If the enterprise were allowed to keep 
(own) its profits, one would not get this negative supply effect of an increase in 
official prices.   
 
A transition may, however, also cause bribe collection to become decentralized and 
hence, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1993), potentially become more harmful to 
growth. In that article they generalize their model of corruption in socialist shortage 
economy to apply to any official who monopolizes the delivery of a public service. 
They distinguish between two cases, one where the official hands over the income to 
the government at its official value, as the socialist ministry did, or a second one 
                                                 
25 This assumption appears fairly realistic for the Soviet Union (cf. Granick, 1980), but less so when 
there were markets to play on, markets that they assume by implication. The divergence between the 
interests of officials and managers then would become too pronounced, as later formulated in Li ‘s 
(1999) analysis of the dual-track system in China. 
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where she may steal it. The last case may become relevant in the post-communist case 
where monitoring breaks down, but the plan allocation still is law. It may also prove 
to have lasting effects because in a market economy setting the bribe-payers (with 
theft) normally pay less than their lawful competitors and tend to out-compete them, 
while they will pay more without theft and be out-competed. Hence, compared to 
bribery without theft, aggregate demand for output would increase and prices fall. 
This evidently was contrary to fact in the early stages of post-communist transition, 
however, but it nevertheless was a prediction that tied aggregate output and corruption 
in one model. 
  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also point to another aspect of  the breakdown of 
monitoring more compatible with stylized facts: It would  not only lead to stealing, 
but also to a decentralization of bribe collection. The Communist Party in a centrally 
planned economy might be considered as a monopolistic bribe collector dealing in a 
system of complementary goods and services. Bribery maximization by a joint 
monopolist agency will take into account the effect of bribes collected for one service 
on the bribery collection of the other. To increase the bribe for one service or good 
will reduce the willingness to pay for another. Hence bribe rates will be kept lower 
than if bribe collection was decentralized, and the agencies would disregard the 
effects on other markets. The rate of bribe collection for each agency will he higher, 
but both aggregate bribes and aggregate output will be lower than in the centralized 
system. With free entry into bribe collection, this negative effect on output should be 
even stronger. 
 
Summing up, if one accepts Shleifer and Vishny’s conception of central planning, it is 
difficult to imagine any other way to organize the economy that would cause more 
extensive forms of corruption.26 But corruption forms could become even more 
harmful when Communist Party control broke down. This theory at one stroke 
appears to explain the production decline of many of the FSU countries during their 
transitions and the better economic performance of  China and Vietnam that stuck to a 
centralized way of collecting bribes. 
 
                                                 
26 Other systems will have fewer situations where demanders would have no alternative to a bribe-
collecting  monopolistic supplier.  
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A number of anomalies immediately arise, however. For, example, because the joint 
bribe collector – the Communist Party -  in China and Vietnam would perform 
centralized  collection gauging  the effects of bribe collection in one industry on the 
bribe collection prospects in the other industries, the economic shortages should also 
be less pronounced than the individualized collection in the FSU countries. The 
opposite appears to be the case, since many of the FSU countries appear to experience 
symptoms of generalized excess supply. 
 
 But before further elaborating weaknesses in the Shleifer and Vishny explanations of 
corruption in the CPEs and their applications to  the transition countries,  I will look at 
another instructive model that ties corruption in the centrally planned economies with 
corruption phenomena that have been displayed in their transitions. 
 
Corruption as one mode of transaction between planners and producers. As Harrison 
and Kim (2001, 2003) point out, one of the implications of the corrupt behavior 
imputed to the ministry-enterprises complexes by Shleifer and Vishny is that they 
should strive to get as low official prices as possible. In this way they could increase 
the bribe earned per unit of output. That implication violates however the well-
established fact that ministries preferred higher prices. Something similar to repressed 
inflation, generalized excess demand, appears to have been deeply ingrained in the 
system.27  
 
In standard descriptions of the planning process, where the ministries and enterprises 
responses are modeled, official prices are assumed fixed, reflecting the fact that the 
official price codes were determined by a separate agency. Relying on recent 
investigations of the Russian state archives, Harrison and Kim found that the Soviet 
managers had much more discretion in influencing prices than most researchers had 
                                                 
27 As mentioned, prices played a modest role in the resource allocation and individual income 
distribution in the classical socialist economy.  Hence, repressed inflation did not imply that prices 
were fixed at too low levels, but rather that they would accommodate most bureaucratic forces that 
determined the enterprises’ deliveries and procurement. At least after Stalin under most circumstances 
the managers in the enterprises/ministries would supply as little of output and procure as much as they 
were allowed to whatever the prices of inputs and outputs, hence generalized excess demand. Higher 
prices for output made the bureaucratic life easier, hence the efforts to increase them, but the price 
levels received were neither a question of survival for the enterprises nor a road to personal enrichment 
for the managers as long as  income credited the enterprise/ministry could not be spent. One of the 
ways high prices made bureaucratic life easier was by making the planned profit goals easier to 
achieve.     
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believed. In the so-called material balances that specified the planned outputs and 
inputs to be supplied by and delivered to the enterprises, planned quantities were not 
quantities after all, but nominal values that, in practice, left scope for considerable 
price manipulation, a fact that Shleifer and Vishny were among the first to build into 
their modeling of the system. The major method applied by the enterprises according 
to Harrison and Kim  was not to fix market prices through monopolistic price-setting, 
however, as Shleifer and Vishny have claimed, but rather to change the output mix 
through ‘innovations’. Since the plan was fixed in nominal values,  an accepted (but 
false)  claim of a higher quality product implied  a higher price  and lower quantity in 
the actual delivery compared to the plan specification  for the enterprise. 
 
The Harrison-Kim model starts with an initial price- output combination that is 
accepted by the planners. They are, however, willing to accept other combinations 
where output may be lower and the price higher, but as the price increases (through 
fake innovations or other means) planners become less and less willing to accept the 
implied output declines. The enterprise may spend effort on this price-increasing 
deception, on leisure or on output. As more effort is spent on driving up the accepted 
price, the enterprise has to give up more output or leisure. The interaction between 
planners and the enterprise will generate an equilibrium output-price mix with a 
higher price and a lower output than the one specified in the plan. 
 
So far there is no monetary corruption or embezzlement in the model although one 
may consider the resulting leisure as a form of embezzlement. Noting that there is 
excess demand in most ‘markets’, Harrison and Kim note that the customers (if they 
have some liquid assets available) may be able to pay a price above the official price. 
In the case of ‘loyal’ managers this unofficial income may be added to the resources 
of the enterprise and give less hidden inflation, more output, and more leisure. Spent 
this way, the bribes received by the enterprise would tend it to produce more and 
cheat less in the sense of delivering less output and charging higher prices than 
assumed by its given nominal plan delivery.28  Harrison and Kim argue that the 
                                                 
28 The model operate with three price levels: The initial, historically given price the planners had in 
mind when specifying the planned nominal delivery of the enterprise, the real planned delivery price 
(after the output cheating),  and  a market price for out of plan delivery. That price is determined by a 
demand  function. When it is above  the real delivery price, the case of shortage, the enterprise will 
keep some output outside the plan. Harrison and Kim suggested that this demand function would only 
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managers’ position normally would lead them to simulate loyalty. If disloyal, the 
transformation curve of the enterprise between hidden inflation and output would be 
unchanged. 
 
In their set-up the degree of tautness, that is, the price-output combinations that the 
planners were willing to accept was an important policy instrument. If they were 
willing to accept more slack it became easier for disloyal managers not to recycle the 
bribes into production, output would tend to fall as the hidden inflation increased 
together with managers’ private consumption.  
 
Seen this way, the reduced tautness in planning may be seen as collusive behavior by 
the managers that caused a downwards pressure on output and upwards pressure on 
hidden inflation and meant that corruption had harmful effects both in this way and by 
increasing the share of the managers who could become disloyal. 
 
The first part of the transition in the FSU-countries may be viewed as a process that 
lifted the price-output acceptance curve far out, hence giving much larger scope for 
output decline and corruption increase. Hence their model is also able to connect 
output levels and corruption  and to explain falling output and increasing corruption, 
the stylized fact of the FSU experience   
 
The first specified model of corruption under central planning I am aware of, Montias 
and Rose-Ackerman (1981)29 also, like the Harrison-Kim model, focuses on situations 
inside the central apparatus which may give rise to corruption. Their starting point 
was the interaction between regular bonus functions and the expected value of bribes 
when both are functions of output, but where they both make discontinuous jumps at 
the plan-fulfilling output level. The bonus function is discontinuous because the 
                                                                                                                                            
apply for consumer goods where the prices would be hard. Consumers would bribe the enterprise 
which could spend the out-of plan output on out-of plan inputs which would make it easier for loyal 
managers to keep the plan. But then we would also have an out-of-plan market for inputs. Our 
enterprise would have to bribe its input suppliers. What would be the size of those bribes?  Harrison 
and Kim apparently raises a macroeconomic question and answer it with a kind of partial equilibrium 
model. Moreover, bringing in a number of features of the planning process,  other games internal to it  
may  look equally convincing. Clearly, the financial plan of the enterprise, and the possibilities of 
manipulating it would be important. Their model appears to have several loose ends. That said, I find 
many of their  macroeconomic conclusions intuitively sound and convincing. 
29 Their model-based analysis was only a minor part of their article that aimed for a broad comparison 
of  corruption possibilities in a centrally planned economy. 
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planners have stipulated it that way (for example in order to make the enterprise to 
reveal its production capacity) and the expected return to corruption is discontinuous 
because the probability of being caught jumps up if the planned level is not achieved. 
Assuming the cost of effort function is quadratic, output-bribe combinations may exist  
that maximize the combined bonus-bribe return, but  where output may be both below 
and above the planned output level. Hence, the effect of bribes on output may easily 
become ambiguous. And a shift in the degree of tautness may trigger the enterprise to 
move either above or below the planned level.  
 
Note the implications drawn for the impact of reduced tautness on corruption were 
rather ambiguous compared to both Harrison and Kim and Shleifer and Vishny who 
all had the advantage of having observed the last years of the Soviet Union. 
Loosening of discipline in the wide sense in both these models implied decreased 
output and increased corruption. 
 
Shortages and the occurrence of family-friendship corruption. Shleifer and Vishny, 
admit that the suppliers might not close the whole shortage gap through their bribe 
demands. Some direct rationing would take place.  But how would the scarce goods 
be rationed? Regular queues were one possibility, and a common (and visible) feature 
of  the centrally planned economies, particularly in the Soviet Union.  Another 
obvious way of rationing – particularly  of consumer goods - was for the suppliers to 
hand them over to family, friends or more  distant acquaintances. At the same time, it 
was obviously of interest of individuals to look for suppliers that were able to give 
them preference.  Hence, the more or less regular, spontaneous creation of personal 
networks  were stimulated by  trafficking in scarce consumer goods. Presumably they 
thereby increased in scope and carried more ‘traffic’ than networks based on pure 
friendship-family feelings.  Their importance is indicated by the fact that personal-
based networking have well-known names, blat in Russia and guanxi in China and 
have received considerable research attention. The Chinese guanxi appears to be more 
formalized, considered more ethically acceptable, and more based on a model of 
family structures.30  
                                                 
30 Michailova and Worm (2002) compare blat and guanxi with personal networking of the regular 
European type. Due to the larger number of goods available and the higher levels of perceived shortage 
in the Soviet Union blat was important for getting hold on scarce goods. That reason disappeared when 
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Many of the modifications of the formal rationing principles caused by the use of 
connections did not involve corruption. Lining up in a queue one could buy something 
extra for friends without violating any principle of socialist governance.31 But a large 
share of the informal rationing involved family-friendship corruption or 
embezzlement. If a queue organizer (such as a shop employee) set aside some high-
quality item for a friend instead of allotting it to those in the public queue, or if she 
was actively sought out by friends, to hand over that quality, she was performing a 
family-friendship corrupt act. As the transaction shades into a quid pro quo, it might 
become close to commercial corruption. If the customer applied political influence it 
shaded off into extortion. Networking might obviously also be used for establishing 
commercially corrupt transactions, for example, by reducing their transaction costs.32  
 
Similarly, networking was also used in inter-industry procurement for many of the 
same reasons. Excess demand made the purchasing enterprises become the active net-
workers, not sellers as is the case in capitalist market economies, including the post-
transition countries. Given the major changes in the consumer markets, one should 
expect the old blat networks of the Soviet Union to become useless and, hence, lead to 
a decline in family-friendship forms of corruption. Ledeneva’s (1998) interviews 
confirm that expectation for Russia. Almost by definition commercial corruption at 
the consumer end would disappear when shops became private and both the supply 
and the demand for consumer goods are determined through public market forces.33    
 
                                                                                                                                            
one get into capitalist excess supply situations. Then blat, using connections, would become useful for 
selling efforts including selling regular labor power.  Ledeneva (2003) covers the same territory. They 
both only compare Russia and China. The parts of the Soviet Union that combined  its economic 
scarcity characteristics with larger family structures such as in the Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia 
probably created the largest personal  network structures. 
31 Or one might violate rules against economic middlemen activity  if one lined up, bought more than 
one needed and resold it for an illegally high price. This was illegal profiteering, but neither 
embezzlement nor corruption if performed by a private individual, according to our definition. 
32 Agelasto (1996) describes in detail how guanxi relation-building facilitated corrupt transactions 
within a Chinese university. The novel Wild Swans Chang (1991) reveals movingly how under the 
extremes of Maoism family structures and family ideology were perceived to be so important in 
furthering corruption (and political rivals) that they had to be crushed.  
33 This would not by necessity contribute to a perceived decline.  Steeped in old socialist norms the 
market mechanism itself might be perceived corrupt. For example, when local shops are allowed to 
increase  prices, it may remind the public of situations where local shop employees charged higher 
prices, i.e. demanded bribes under the counter. Just after the transition answering a questionnaire in 
Czechoslovakia, the respondents now considered hairdressing as one of the most corrupt industries! 
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When it comes to inter-industry transactions, the need for networks remains. But as 
the economic system moves from a situation of generalized excess demand before the 
transition to a perceived excess supply situation (Weitzman, 1984) of regular  
monopolistic competition after, one would need networks to assist in  selling output 
rather than just for the procurement of inputs. Whether these networks have increased 
in size and whether they depend more on family-friendship links, or on corrupt 
commercial links after the transition is not only a matter of  definition. In general, 
however, it appears that family- friendship corruption is likely to have been more 
common under central planning than during the transition and afterwards.     
 
Transaction costs of  central planning as a restraint on corruption. 
 
In order to understand the issues of day- to-day corruption in the centrally planned 
economies, it may be fruitful to distinguish between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ forms. 
Internal corruption arose in the transactions between state enterprises, planning units 
or other institutions inside the governmental apparatuses. Here the forms of financial 
control were crucial in containing corruption. The external corruption arose mainly in 
the interaction between enterprises and the other governmental units at one side and 
the consumers on the other. Where corruption was extensive, illegal private 
enterprises may arise.  
 
Above these units party organizations coordinated and monitored both the internal 
and external transactions. When they were bribed, we are mainly dealing with 
political corruption. Party officials could be bribed by both consumers and 
government units, i.e. be involved in both external and internal forms of corruption. 
KGB and other police units again monitored party officials. Their role increased as 
the corruption of party members become more common. Since the party was decisive 
in the important employment decisions, it was its control of this lever that was also 
the key to party corruption, hence the political forms of corruption that took place.   
 
 Most of the analytical attention to corruption in the former socialist countries has 
focused on ‘internal’ corruption, corruption tied to the planning process itself. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992, 1993) were  an exception. As noted, they considered the  Soviet 
economic planning simply as a form of generalized monopolistic supply confronting 
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consumers. Hence, it was not necessary to go into detail of its inner workings.  In an 
earlier paper I (Andvig 1985) also argued that the corruption in the Soviet Union was 
connected to the interaction between the planning mechanism and the market sectors, 
particularly the illegal ones.  The argument was not specified in a model, but traced a 
number of institutional links that worked backwards into the planning apparatus.  
 
The starting point was the observation that exceptionally high transaction costs in 
making corrupt deals should constrain corruption in the centrally planned economies. 
Due to its illegality, there were always considerable transaction costs involved in 
order to complete any corrupt transaction whatever the kind of economic system 
ruling. Moreover, those transaction costs would normally be reduced if for some 
reason the incidence of corruption increased. In market economies the enterprises 
initiate and pay a large share of the total amount of bribes paid.34  In a centrally 
planned economy they were likely to pay a smaller share of the total.  One reason was 
simply that the enterprise and the corresponding ministry often in practice acted as 
one administrative unit. Thus, the enterprise had no incentive to pay bribes to its own 
regulators in the ministry.35   Moreover, the regular transaction costs of corruption 
were compounded by the difficulty of finding matches for corrupt barter deals. 
Substantial corrupt transactions across industries demanded that a corrupt enterprise 
had to pay with its own output and then normally would have to get involved in large 
multilateral barter deals. While facilitated by blat chains, the initial transaction costs 
would still be much higher than in a market economy – at least for the capital goods 
industries. 
 
The transaction costs would not be so high for consumer goods, however. The shops 
transacted with cash-using purchasers, the consumers. Moreover the consumer goods 
were also more liquid in the sense that they were on average more tempting to 
embezzle by the employees themselves. In various ways corrupt incentives would be 
                                                 
34 One indication that Russia now has become a market economy is that most bribes appear to be paid 
by the enterprises. Citing results from the  INDEM survey (planned as a part of the World Bank’s 
Diagnostic surveys of corruption) Ledeneva (2005) reports that today about 90% of bribes are business  
related while only 10% are paid by households. 
35 This feature has been one of the most important ones in making the post-socialist countries so easily 
exposed to corruption. The author could observe some of the problems involved in the case of the state-
owned oil company in Azerbaijan, SOCAR, that for many purposes  remained a government ministry 
of energy after the transition to a market economy had been completed. 
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much stronger here, everything else equal. The signs of pervasive corruption were 
hence most visible in some consumption industries, might spread backwards, but were 
then in general less visible forms, except for the areas of the former Soviet Union that 
had the highest incidence of corruption.  
 
Given the context of the socialist society, many types of market transactions were 
illegal without being corrupt according to our definition. But regular, illegal markets 
stimulated corruption in a centrally planned economy along several routes.  In 
addition to the direct demand for (corrupt) public protection, the underground 
economy presented an outlet for some of the state enterprises’ output yielding 
uncontrolled income that may, if needed, be spent on bribery. Here we have a clear 
incidence of increasing returns to scope of illegal market transactions that also 
increased the motives for corrupt transactions as well as reducing their transaction 
costs.  
 
The evidence for the importance of illegal consumer markets as a mechanism that 
reduced the transaction costs of corruption, increasing its scope and incidence has 
mainly to be sought in roundabout ways. No corruption perception indexes existed, but 
in the case of the Soviet Union we have useful regional indicators that may throw light 
on the importance of transaction costs: estimates of the size of the second economy, the 
number of newspaper stories about corruption (Holmes, 1993) or the number of people 
convicted of economic crimes including corruption (Clark, 1993). Many stories of a 
more or less anecdotal kind support the impression of an uneven distribution of corrupt 
transactions. If the major corruption transactions had started from the center, we would 
expect either the highest incidence in Russia around Moscow or, alternatively, a rather 
even incidence across the regions.  
 
While anecdotal, single, well-documented stories may reveal more general features of  
the extensiveness of the phenomenon  and its  geographical distribution. For example, 
stories of large-scale corruption such as the famous Uzbek cotton scam, is revealing 
since it is almost prohibitively difficult to organize a large number of people in a 
network of corrupt transactions in low-corruption surroundings. That is, a single story 
may then have strong implications for the quantitative assessment of the situation. 
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Another  clear quantitative indication of the increasing size of the second economy is the 
detailed study of it made by Treml and Alexeev (1993). They showed that the statistical 
correlation between official income and savings, and income and the registered sale of 
important consumer goods, weakened strongly in the period between 1965 and the late 
1980s (even for alcohol). A reasonable interpretation is that the lack of correlation was 
due to the fact that a larger share of household income came from unofficial sources, and 
a larger share of consumer goods items was sold outside official channels. As an 
indication of the likely positive connection between corruption and the size of the second 
economy over time consider the following table which shows a rough cross-section 
correlation between the estimated size of pre-transition second economies and the 
economic crime conviction rates: 
 
 
Table1 . Corruption and second economy. Regional estimates for the FSU area  
Country 
Conviction rates 
per million popu-
lation 1965–1990 
Control of cor-
ruption 
1997/98 
Unofficial eco-
nomy share 1979 
(%) 
Unofficial eco-
nomy share 1995 
(%) 
Armenia 7.27 -0.80  …  ... 
Azerbaijan  21.85 -1.00 50 70 
Belarus 0.20 -0.65 43 35 
Estonia 2.14  22 22 
Georgia 15.00 -0.74 50 71 
Kazakhstan 1.21 -0.87 50 50 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 3.85 -0.76 … … 
Latvia 0.00 -0.26 34 41 
Lithuania 1.41 0.03 34 31 
Moldova 4.63 -0.39 43 48 
Russia 2.81 -0.62 27 46 
Tajikistan 2.00 -1.32  …  … 
Turkmenistan 4.06 -1.29 …  … 
Ukraine 1.70 -0.89 38 57 
Uzbekistan 2.71 -0.96 50 29 
Sources: Clark,(1993, Table 3.5), Kaufmann et al. (2002, Table2), Alexeev & Pyle( 2001, Table 5–6). 
 
The pre-transition conviction rates are of course a very rough corruption indicator. 
The high rates in Azerbaijan may, for example, reflect the effectiveness of Heydar 
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Aliev’s anticorruption campaign in fighting competing corrupt networks, not his own 
corruption (Vaksberg, 1991), and the low rates in Tajikistan indicate ineffective 
economic policing, and so on.36 The table also indicates a surprising degree of 
persistence in corruption and the size of the underground economy across the 
transition to legal market economies in the different areas.37 This persistence may 
suggest the importance and the ability of family and other informal networks in 
undermining formal structures whether they are planning or market oriented. 
 
The high corruption rates in such Soviet areas as Georgia and Azerbaijan were 
reflected in the bribe rates for entry to the universities. For example, while the bribe 
rate for the entry to medical studies at Moscow University was 6,000 rubles in 1979 
and rising, the rate was 15,000 rubles in Georgia and 30,000 in Azerbaijan (Simis, 
1982, 167). These bribe rates were likely to capture some of the capitalized value of 
expected bribe income of the future medical doctors in the areas, hence the capitalized 
value of their future stream of bribe incomes.  
 
As observed in the Harrison\Kim model, the degree of tautness in plans may affect 
internal corruption.  Increasing tautness ‘forces’ the managers to break more rules in 
order to achieve plan-fulfillment, which would increase the incentives to bribe input 
suppliers. However, if the financial side were also tightened, corrupt transactions 
would be restrained due to the transaction costs involved in barter corruption. 
 
The degree of tautness would also work through the interaction between the planning 
process and the market side of the economy. In particular, a large reduction in 
tautness could change the nature of corruption as it related to the planning process. 
Any softening of monitoring combined with less taut planning made it easier to 
produce goods outside the plan. In particular, the softening of planned restrictions on 
the allocation of hard money to the enterprises made it easier to buy inputs through 
bribes. On the other side of the ledger, if it becomes easier to sell outside the plan (i.e. 
                                                 
36  An alternative interpretation alluded to, is that the size of the underground economy, corruption and 
corruption convictions were all expressions of political resistance and the force applied in the fighting 
of it. This interpretation is belied both by the low numbers of individuals caught in all areas and the 
indications of lower corruption rates in areas like Estonia.  
37 This is particularly surprising for the size of underground economies, since one should expect that 
most of the motivation for the participating in the underground should disappear with central planning. 
Moreover, they showed  steeper production decline, another surprise since these areas should be more 
accustomed to market transactions.  
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easier to receive hard cash bribes), it would transform the soft incentive of gaining an 
easy life through easy plans (high input allocations and low output obligations) to the 
hard incentive of gaining more cash bribes through easier plans. 
 
At the cash borders of the planned economy, the consumer goods industries, the 
transaction costs of making corrupt deals, had always been modest. Combined with 
the usual state of excess demand in the consumption goods markets, it led to bribing 
being a dominant way to get access to scarce goods. For example, when a sample of 
people in Czechoslovakia was asked in 1989 about the area in which bribery was most 
prevalent, 26% mentioned retail sales as the number one sector (Lizal and Kocenda, 
2000). 31% mentioned services, while only 3% mentioned state administration.38 
 
In times of easier income policy, excess demand for consumer goods increased and 
the extent of corruption to gain access to legally produced consumer goods increased. 
At the same time such policies tended to reduce the supply of labor without inducing 
any increase in the legal supply of consumer goods, worsening the excess demand. 
One of the paradoxes of the socialist economy was that the strengthening of 
democratic forces and the authorities’ yielding to popular demands normally resulted 
in a worsening economic situation for the population with longer queues, more cor-
ruption, an expansion in the second economy, and more criminal activities. It was 
from this loosening of control that more elaborate schemes for creating second 
economy enterprises could be built. 
 
Most observes agree that the degree of plan tautness was reduced while the incidence 
of corruption as well as the size of the underground economy increased during the 
1970s in the Soviet Union. This indicates that the internal effects of increased tautness 
on corruption were weaker than the external ones and their feedback on the planned 
economy. The financial aspects were the most important. If loosened, the resulting 
excess demand for consumer goods stimulated corruption directly. Secondly, the 
resulting growth of the second economy increased the demand for bribes at the same 
time as its growth implied a gradual decrease in the transaction costs of corrupt deals. 
In certain areas, such as in the Caucasus, the scale of the second economy was 
                                                 
38 Other  cash-close sectors like health services also scored high (21%) in 1989.  In 1998 31% 
mentioned state administration. 
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sufficient to make the border and internal types of corruption merge. When an 
enterprise was able to keep part of its output outside the plan, one part of the cash 
demand came from enterprises willing to acquire input outside the plan and pay for it 
in order to satisfy its plan. The second part was coming from (legal) enterprises that 
needed extra input in order to sell output outside the plan, and a third part of the 
demand came from enterprises working wholly outside the plan, enterprises 
completely submerged in the underground economy.  
 
Many individualized public services (or punishments) such as hospital services, 
schooling, jailing, which confronted the individual private consumer, had similar 
corruption characteristics as retailing; transaction costs were small because of the use 
of cash, excess demand, and so on. The demand for bribes in the police and judicial 
sectors became exceptionally strong due to the growth of the second economy, the 
weak rights of individuals, and the harsh penal codes. The lack of ideological under-
pinnings for an independent judiciary and police contributed in making bribery 
endemic and cheap in these sectors. 
. 
In principle, foreign trade was another sector where the socialist economies used cash. 
Since the customers here were not forced to buy from a socialist supplier, their 
incentives for bribing were in general more modest, however. Moreover, foreign trade 
was concentrated in large, specialized foreign trade organizations that were strictly 
monitored almost to the end. Because the customers were not directly linked to 
suppliers, foreign trade did not in general became a nucleus for expanding corrupt 
second-economy clusters, as in other sectors where the demand for cash was high.39 
That changed after the transition. 
 
                                                 
39 There might have been exceptions to this. Cross-border networks were likely to have been significant 
between the Caucasus and Turkey, maybe also between the Caucasus and Iran. These networks still 
exist, but with the exception of oil, now probably dealing in different products. Caucasian Jews 
probably also had wider international networks with some pre-transition impact. With impact here I 
mean an ability to feed goods into or out from the Soviet second economy. As far as I know little is 
known about these international aspects of the Soviet second economy. I have, for example, not found 
any reference in the social anthropological studies of Altman and Mars, cf. Altman (1989) and Altman 
& Mars (1983). Well-informed rumours about the origin of some of the largest recent private fortunes 
in Azerbaijan tell about such origins, in this case exports of embezzled oil. Due to the strong mutual 
monitoring  among private consumers in China, foreign trade related corruption has been relatively 
more important. 
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 Compared to capitalist countries with a similar incidence of corruption, corruption in 
the centrally planned economies was more pervasive in retailing, at least in the former 
Soviet Union but less so in investment and infrastructure. Bribes were paid by buyers  
not suppliers. An important braking mechanism was the limited role of money, not 
only for resource allocation within the planning process, but also for its limited ability 
to buy secure property rights in luxury goods. Not only was most valuable private 
property allocated through political channels, but once acquired, the owners needed 
continual political acceptance to keep control of their possessions. The ideology of the 
communist parties, however perverted, functioned as a real brake on the elite’s ability 
to acquire luxuries and private properties through illegal means such as bribery.  
 
The transaction cost perspective would predict that the laxer policies of the Breznev  
years should increase corruption. Since monetary policies in the Soviet Union in 
general was easier than in China, this also contribute to make the transaction costs of 
corruption be lower. Another prediction from this perspective is that the incidence of 
corruption may become geographically uneven if the size of the underground 
economy also was geographically uneven. The argument for multiple equilibria levels 
of corruption (Andvig and Moene, 1990)  combined with some (possibly small) initial 
cultural differences in the ease by which informal networks may be created  may 
explain the geographical unevenness. Moreover, it may explain how  small initial 
differences in transaction costs  (for example caused by locally more  extensive 
family networks) may survive both through the initial imposition of central planning 
and its demise through the imposition of another  structure of formal organizations 
more adapted to market conditions. 
 
While hard evidence is missing, the difference in the incidence the retail, external 
forms of corruption between China (when centrally planned) and the Soviet Union in 
its last two decades is difficult to explain fully by softer income policies.40 The 
citizen- party officials mutual monitoring that the Chinese system has become 
renowned for, is also likely to have played an important role also here. 
  
                                                 
40 Although both areas had by then moved away from classical central planning, it may be indicative of 
the difference that reported incidence of bribes paid by households during a year was about three times 
as frequent in Moscow as in Beijing in the mid 1990s (Zvekic, 1998?). 
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6. The transition processes and corruption 
 
While the original central planning systems of the FSUA and China only varied in 
detail, their transition processes varied in fundamental ways. However, all of them 
promoted a rapid expansion of the economic fields where markets were introduced  to 
coordinate decisions and reward agents. The key difference was political. One may 
distinguish between three major situations: 
1) The Communist Party keeps it power. Examples: China and Vietnam 
2) The Communist Party looses its power, but no alternative, established 
political forces wholly outside the dominant networks internal to the 
Communist Party  (or secret police) exist at the point of transition. 
Examples: The FSU countries except Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 
Romania and - partly - Bulgaria.  
3)  The Communist Party looses its power, but alternative, established 
political forces exist or evolve rapidly. That is opposition activities –open 
or secret  - had evolved during the reign of the Communist Party. 
Examples are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland. 
 
Only in the first situation was the rate of institutional change really an action 
parameter from the start. Given the economic roles of the communist parties in the 
socialist system, when losing power, a de facto revolution of the economic system had 
in fact occurred and key components of the planned economy would have to unravel. 
In that sense both the 2)-and 3)-type of situations implied a revolution and the speed 
of change was not in anyone’s control. Seen from that perspective, the extensive 
debates about the economic and political advantages of “ big bang” versus 
“gradualism” (Roland, 2000) may appear somewhat academic. Big bangs had in fact 
occurred.41  
 
Nevertheless, looking at the detailed change in the institutional mix of economic 
governance after the initial transition towards a market economy, different speeds 
                                                 
41 One may wonder why this obvious characteristic of the situation was neglected? I believe that the old 
and often quite legitimate tradition in economics of considering policy as exogenous  here has been 
mixed by  the particular lack of any rigorous analysis of the economic roles of the communist party.  In 
the major economics textbook  of the transition (Roland, 2000) neither the communist party nor 
‘nomenklatura’ figures in the subject index. 
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evolved after each kind of initial condition.42  In group 1 Vietnam moved fast, China, 
slow; in group 2  Russia  had a fast transition, Ukraine, a slow process; in group 3 
Poland  had a fast transition, Hungary, a slow one. One may then question whether the 
initial distribution of transitions into three types is a fruitful one.  If we look at the 
growth-corruption nexus, however, it appears to be important. Whether fast or slow, it 
is in type-2) political kick-off situations where the initial production declines were 
most extensive. It is also among countries that belong to this group that corruption 
appears to have become most serious. Whether fast or slow, type–1) kick-offs seem to 
result in high growth and increased (perceived) corruption, while type-3) countries 
have experienced more modest production declines and increases in perceived 
corruption whether institutional changes have evolved fast or slowly. 
 
This does not imply that the fast-slow distinction is without interest for the growth-
corruption nexus. Moreover, the reasons for why countries fell into slow or fast  
patterns may differ according to kick-off type. For example, it is still an open question 
whether the revolutions of the 2) -type were deliberately planned by insiders or not. It 
is difficult to believe, however, that key power-holders in such a centralized system as 
a communist party before the revolution could become so rich so fast after the 
revolution without being aware of the prospects beforehand and without trying to 
manufacture it. This is obviously a question for future historians to clarify. The degree 
of deliberate pre-planning probably varied to some extent.  However, if the kick-off 
were premeditated in the sense described above, with basically the same agency 
before and after, tactical considerations may decide: Some early ‘transitioners’ may  
prefer fast privatization in order  to convert as much of their pre-transition political 
power into economic valuable assets in a capitalist market economy.  If one, for 
example, risked that foreigners, such as the Russians in Azerbaijan, would both have 
the necessary inside information – and larger stocks of  liquid assets,  the old Azeri 
party networks may prefer to hang on their old party employment levers to tax the 
                                                 
42 The notions of fast and slow change in institutional mix as the notion of market expansion itself, are , 
of course rather fuzzy concepts.  Liberalization indexes, aggregating different type of changes, have 
been constructed by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. For our purposes a more 
intuitive notion would suffice. Clearly included is how fast planned allocation of goods and services 
were supplanted by market allocation, and how fast collective ownership forms were supplanted by 
private, or individualized forms of ownership.  Here legal and real changes may differ. For example, 
inter-firm bartering in Russia continued several years after the  formal multilateral bartering system, 
(called planning) of USSR  had been dismantled.    
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enterprises, keep their capital values down  that way, and delay privatization until  
they had collected sufficiently cash on their own. 
 
One may summarize the discussion of transition types in the following table: 
 
                             Table 2. A transition typology 
 
Speed of 
change 
Post-transition Communist Party position 
 Keep formal 
power  
Dominant 
networks kept 
Opposition 
networks 
dominant 
Fast Vietnam Russia, 
Bulgaria   
Estonia, 
Poland 
Slow China Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan  
Hungary, 
Slovenia 
 
     
 
As in most typologies, there are cases of ‘more or less’ that may not wholly fit into 
categories of either-or. Uzbekistan is a mixed case of kick-off type 1) and 2), Bulgaria 
a mixture of all kick-off types,  Albania may have more of the symptoms of a type 2) 
country, but may in fact formally belong to group 3), and so on.   
 
Based on similar observations, Walder (2003) also notes the importance of initial 
conditions, but he divides the transition processes into four types defined along two 
dimensions:  extensive or low degree of regime change, and high or low barriers to  
asset appropriation. That is, he focus on the embezzlement aspects of corruption. The 
countries with low barriers to asset appropriation coincide with our group 2.  
 
This is not so surprising. As long as the Communist Party retains power, it is difficult 
for individuals to appropriate assets under its control. And if a large share of the 
population is mobilized against the Communist Party in workable organizations, it 
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becomes difficult for the former power-holders to use their initial positions to acquire 
individual assets, since they have lost their power, while the new, emerging power-
holders have based their power on a system that make such conversions more 
difficult. 
 
 Walder documents the elite’s opportunities before and after the new conditions arise, 
and studying the elite’s survival rates under the regime change. Not surprisingly, the 
survival rate of elite membership of individuals across the transition was highest in 
group 1 and lowest in group3, but even in this group it was high. Group 2 was 
somewhat in between, and their survival rate appears to be very high.43 Walder’s main 
focus is on China, however. Here he shows that communist cadres also did well after 
the transition and were able to combine private enterprise and cadre position in areas 
where private entrepreneurs earned significantly more than a cadre without a private 
enterprise in the family. 
 
 Walder suggests – as  we have - that one reason  why transition occurred in the first 
place is that the private income of the elites of the socialist economies was severely 
restrained. That applies to all three kick-off types. It is difficult to imagine that the 
elites were completely unaware of the possibilities of becoming very rich after the 
move towards a capitalist market economy, but as pointed out by Walder there were 
different restraints in the three situations as well as different types of risks. 
 
It was not only embezzlement  that was easier to perform from type-2) initial 
situations. Regular corruption appears to have evolved also as a more serious problem 
too, despite the tactical substitution effects between embezzlement (illegitimate 
privatization) and bribe collection inside this position. Considering that GDP levels 
and perceived corruption levels are usually negatively correlated, the following table 
indicates support for that proposition:44 
                                                 
43 In a study of  post-transition elites in Russia,  Steen (2000:11) found that 97%  of the elite members 
had been communist party members. 94% of private businessmen had been so, but then only 43% had 
been mid-level leaders and none in a top position. Among state enterprise businessmen 11% had  been 
so. 
44 In interpreting the table, we have, of course, to make several qualifying observations. The control of 
corruption variable is based on a number of sub-indexes, so it is possible that it may not be able to 
discriminate between corrupt transactions and embezzlement. When the statistical association between  
GDP and corruption indicators are exposed to some econometric tests, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) 
argue that the causality is one way from governance (corruption) to GDP not the other way around. If 
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Table 3. ‘Control of corruption’ values for a sample of post-socialist countries45       
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
China  -0.01 -0.14 -0.34 -0.35 -0.51 
Vietnam -0.64 -0.60 -0.71 -0.67 -0.74 
Russia -0.74 -0.69 -1.02 -0.92 -0.72 
Ukraine -0.74 -0.89 -0.96 -0.97 -0.89 
Poland  0.41 0.49 0.49 0.40 0.16 
Hungary 0.63 0.69 0.78 0.59 0.65 
 
 The striking difference was in growth rates of GDP, however. For China the 
beginning of the reform transition was 1978 –79, and in Vietnam it was 1989.46 For 
both the yearly growth rates in GDP were around  8% during the first reform decade. 
The second group was characterized by initially strong  production declines. The 
beginning of reform for the FSU countries was 1991-1992 and the rate of yearly GDP 
decline was around 5-8% for the first decade.  For Russia and Ukraine positive 
growth two years in the row did not occur for almost a decade after the decline had 
begun.  
 
Given the way socialist planning economies were organized, it is not surprising that 
the initial conditions at the point when the process started had a strong impact that 
would be difficult to change by the formal institutional mixes chosen. This follows 
from the fact that they all had been organized as centralized bureaucracies. As such 
any transition implied that some central signals were sent to the underlying 
bureaucratic units. In that context even a message that you were to become a private 
enterprise was a message sent by a central bureaucracy. Different kick-off types 
implied widely divergent signals from the centers. They had to affect most underlying 
units by the very construction of the economic system from which one departed. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
so, the higher  GDP levels of Russia and Ukraine  compared to China and Vietnam should not be used 
as an argument claiming that the observed differences in governance is an underestimate.  Since the 
change in governance that followed the transition contributed negatively to GDP (as the decline in 
GDP probably contributed to corruption in these countries, (Andvig, 2002)) while the GDP levels had 
been built up under a different system of governance I still consider the GDP argument as supporting 
the proposition above. 
45 Table 3 is based on  table C6 in Kaufmann et al (2005). For the table 3 I have chosen two larger or 
typical countries from each group. No corruption indicators existed at the outset of the various 
transition processes. 
46 Here we should add that industrial output declined in 1989, when the more extensive part of 
Vietnam’s transition began ( Doanh et al, 2002).  
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Although production declined in most of the group 2 countries the difference in the 
rates of decline was striking. In the case of the FSU area, regional data underline the 
extent and variation of the production decline and indicators of corruption rates.  
Since the first observations of extensive production declines were made in Poland 
(Blanchard, 1991), one has argued that the methods applied in their estimation tend to 
exaggerate the decline, however, but few argue against the proposition that the decline 
has been considerable, which suffices for our qualitative discussion.  
 
 
Table 4. Production decline and corruption indicators in  FSU47 
Country 
Cumulative 
output 
decline to 
lowest 
level (1989 
= 100) in 
% 
Control of 
corruption 
1997/98 
Capture 
economy 
index 
Administrative 
corruption % 
of revenues of 
all firms 
Armenia 65.1 -0.80 7 4.6 
Azerbaijan  63.1 -1.00 41 5.7 
Belarus 36.9 -0.65 8 1.3 
Georgia 74.6 -0.74 24 4.3 
Kazakhstan 40.0 -0.87 12 3.1 
Kyrgyz Republic 50.4 -0.76 29 5.3 
Moldova 66.3 -0.39 37 4.0 
Russia 45.1 -0.62 32 2.8 
Tajikistan 74.0 -1.32 … … 
Turkmenistan 59.5 -1.29 … … 
Ukraine 63.8 -0.89 32 4.4 
Uzbekistan 14.4 -0.96 6 4.4 
Sources:Fischer and Sahay(2000, Table 1), Kaufmann et al. (2002, Table2) Hellman et a.l (2000,Table 1-2)48 
 
   Hence, among the group-2) countries of the FSU  production declines ranged from 
74.6% for Georgia ( i.e. at the lowest, GDP in Georgia was only 25.4% of its level in 
1989 ) to 14.4% for Uzbekistan. In Russia proper the production decline was 45.1%. 
Inside group- 2) the rates of output decline appear to follow an inverse U function as a 
function of the rate of regime change. A high rate of change may reflect the 
                                                 
47 Note that I have deleted Estonia ,Latvia and Lithuania from the FSU area, since they rather belong to 
group 3) than group 2).  
48 The control of corruption variable is ranging from 2.5 to –2.5 and is heavily influenced by 
perceptions (explained in Kaufmann et al (2002). The capture index indicates the degree  to which 
firms buy political or judicial decisions. Higher value means stronger tendency. (The index is explained 
in Hellman et al (2000). That measure, together with the indicator of petty corruption are likely to be 
less influenced by perceptions and more by actual occurrence of corrupt acts, but they still  have strong 
perception components..     
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implementation capabilities of a country’s bureaucracy (associated with its GDP-
levels) while a slow rate of change may on the other hand cause less disruption. 
 
A rough inspection of Table 4 tells us that there is likely to have been some rough 
correlation between the relative size of the production decline and the extent of 
corruption in the country. A somewhat surprising result, not evident from inspection 
of the table, is that the production decline appears to be inversely related to the initial 
size of GDP per capita. 
 
For China we have only summary data for the key period. For the whole period 1978 
– 1995 the per capita growth rates were all positive, ranging from 5.1% in Qinghai to 
12.8% in Zhejiang. The average rate of growth for all China was 9.3% (Yao and 
Zhang, 2001).  Here the regional corruption rate appears not to be related to the rate of 
change in GDP. The same applies for Vietnam (Khuong and Haughton, 2004: 16).     
Another striking difference that is likely partly to reflect differences in the transition 
processes, partly differences in initial structure, is the size and growth of the 
underground economy. The size of the underground economy in China is surprisingly 
small, only13.1% in 2000 while it was 46.1% in Russia (Schneider and Klinglmair, 
2004). In Russia the relative size had increased from 27% in 1979 (Alexeev and Pyle, 
2001).  The relative size of the underground economy in China has also been 
increasing, but only slowly so.49 
 
In both areas the income distributions became dramatically more unequal during the 
transition process, although the process was faster in Russia. Today is the rate of  
income inequality between Russia and China  quite equal when measured by Gini 
indexes despite their differences in economic structure.50 
 
                                                 
49 In 1994/95 it was 10.1% according to the Schneider research group. Inside the FSUA there appears 
to be  fairly clear correlation between the relative size of  the underground economy and indicators of 
corruption levels both before and after the transition. Evidence is provided in Andvig (2002: 38). 
Schneider provides cross-country evidence that indicates negative effects on growth rates.  
50 Ellman (2000) calculates the rise in the value of the Gini coefficient for Russia from 24 in 1987-88 to 
48 in 1993-95.According to Xu and Zou (2000) the increase in China was from 25.7 in 1984 to 37.8 in  
1992. In 2000  the Gini coefficient was 45.6 for Russia and  44.7 for China (World Development 
Indicators 2004). 
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Let us finally look  again at some of the  comparative corruption data. None is based 
on systematic observation. The most easily accessible data are based upon 
perceptions, mainly made by experts, journalists and businessmen. There are two 
major public corruption perception indexes, the Transparency International’s CPI 
index and the World Bank Institute’s (WBI) ‘Control of corruption’ index.51 WBI has 
estimates for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004, as shown in table 3. TI has yearly 
observations since 1995. What are the main results?  
 
With the exception of the CPI index for 1996 all observations give higher perceived 
corruption levels for Russia compared to China. For example, in 2000 the WBI index 
records – 1.05 for Russia and  -0.34 for China; the TI index  2.1  for Russia and 3.1 
for China. TI  ranks China as the 63. and Russia as the 82. most corrupt (out of 90). 
The difference between perceived corruption levels appear significant, but as a 
statement about the real incidence the result should be interpreted with care. Russians 
may just be more worried  about their corruption or an information cascade among 
expatriate businessmen and international aid workers may suffice. Nevertheless, this 
difference in perception  is of  interest.   
 
Is it possible to note any trend from the perception index data? Although corruption in 
China appears to increase somewhat according to the WBI index, it decreases 
according to the TI index. Here we should note, however, that the TI index started 
with  a very high corruption result for China in 1995, when it was estimated to be the 
second-most corrupt among the 62 countries then included (Russia was not included 
in the TI index for that  year). Interpretation of changes in these indices over time is 
hazardous for a number of reasons52, but at least for China Kaufmann and Kraay 
believe a significant worsening has occurred. 
                                                 
51 The construction  of TI’s index is explained in Lambsdorff  (2003), the construction of WBI’s index 
in Kaufmann et al  (1999). They are constructed on the bases of  the same sub-indexes, but are 
aggregated in different ways. WBI refuses to rank countries since rank differences in most cases are not 
statistically significant. The WBI index varies between  - 2.5 (the most  perceived corruption possible) 
to +2.5. Although TI has observations that go further back in time I have used the WBI results, since 
the aggregation methods it applies has made it possible to accommodate more sub-indexes with closer  
ties to experience (see Andvig, 2005).  
52 One is that a change from one year of observation to the next  in one country’s relative position to 
the least or the most corrupt country may change the index value ascribed to it without any underlying 
change in how corrupt it is conceived to be.  Second the variance of the indexes are so large that the 
cases where one may find statistical significant increase or decrease in the index value is rare. For the 
WBI index Kaufmann et al (2005) have constructed a measure of significant  change. For the period 
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The major impression from these perception data – that China appears to be less 
corrupt than Russia – is confirmed by bits and scraps of other comparative data. Here 
I will emphasize the results from the large international crime victimization surveys 
since they are both comparative and closer to experience. Alas, we have only one 
observation from China.  5.6% of respondents to a questionnaire on crime 
victimization in Beijing 1994 answered that they had been exposed to corruption the 
last year, while 11.8% had such an experience in Moscow in 1992 and  18.7% in 1995 
(Zvekic et al, 1995, Zvekic, 1998(?)).53 
 
The World Values Survey is also of some interest, although difficult to interpret. As 
reported in Moreno (2002), the respondents in China expressed less tolerance of 
corruption, and they appeared more trustful and supportive of democracy than the 
respondents in Russia.54   
 
7. The dual track system and corruption 
 
One way to introduce a market economy slowly was the so-called dual-track system. 
It was most systematically used in China after 1985, and was an important component 
of the economy till 1993, but has been more or less gradually been phased out. While  
36% of industrial goods were allocated through markets in 1990, 88% were so in 
2001. The great leap here was made in 1993. By now at most some  regional residues 
appear to remain (Hope and Lau, 2004). Variations of a dual track system were 
independently introduced in Hungary and sought copied in Russia.55  The system 
demands strong monitoring. The  construction of the Chinese dual-track system 
consisted of three parts:  
                                                                                                                                            
1996 – 2004 . Among the group of countries we have focused on,  Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia have 
become significantly less corrupt, while Moldova (kick-off type 2) country)  and China have become 
more so. The other countries did not show any  statistically significant change. 
53 In the last Transparency International’s (2004) so called Global Barometer, the extent and 
persistence of small-scale corruption in the European group -2)  is surprising. In 2004, 21%  of the 
respondents in Russia, 25% in Ukraine and Romania reported that they had paid a bribe last year. 
54 Again , we must be careful with the interpretation. This survey report strictly on professed values and 
deals more with cheating and embezzlement, questions like whether it is justifiable to avoid paying on 
public transport, cheating on taxes and so on.  It is difficult to tell how one should interpret results like 
India and China having lower corruption permissiveness than Norway and Finland.  
55 It is at  present also applied in some public sectors of advanced capitalist market economies as in the 
health care system in Norway, and now also in the UK.  
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1) each state-owned enterprise (SEO) was ordered to supply  
some plan-allocated output at plan-determined prices and 
were supposed to receive a corresponding amount of plan-
allocated input also at plan-determined prices. A system of 
material balances should ensure that in-plan output and input 
quantities meshed.  
2)  Planned output was to be handed over, and planned input 
was to be received from the same government organization, 
the  Material Supply Bureau (MSB).  
3) When the output quota was satisfied, the enterprise could 
sell the rest of its outputs in the market, possibly using any 
left-over input. However most of the input needed for out-of- 
plan output should be bought in the new markets that had 
been created and legalized  as part of  the dual track system.  
The system had evolved more or less informally since 1979, 
but was formalized in 1985 when the market prices also 
were liberalized (Li, 1999).  
 
Given the shortage situation induced by central planning, it was not surprising that the 
market prices for both inputs and outputs increased above the planned prices. Hence 
one would have expected strong pressures to arise for enterprises to get as much 
planned input from the procurement agencies as possible and for them to supply as 
little output to the plan as possible. The pressure should be stronger the larger the 
difference between market- and plan prices. In fact, the opposite happened:  Planned 
output as a share of total output increased and planned inputs as share of total inputs 
decreased as the market prices increased compared to the planned prices in the late 
1980s. 
 
 For example, in 1984 average in-plan procurement per SOE (state owned enterprise) 
was 33.9 million yuan (measured in market prices) when output prices were 6% above 
plan prices while in- plan delivery per firm was 20.4 million and market prices for 
intermediate input were 24% above plan prices. (Li 2002: 20).  Note that procurement 
and delivery was defined from the point of view of the procurement organization, not 
the enterprises. In 1988 the market prices for the enterprises’ output were 16% above 
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plan prices while input market prices now were wholly 80% above plan prices.  But 
now the enterprises could only receive plan inputs for 14.1 million yuan (in 1989 
market prices) while they were forced to supply 45.2 million yuan each to the material 
supply organization (ibid.). The simple explanation is that the officials in the 
procurement organization were more powerful than the enterprise managers and could 
collect most of the rent created by the price divergence; they could procure goods 
cheaply through the plan and sell them for a higher price in the market.  
 
One may ask what this power was based on? Given the legal existence of markets for 
out-of-plan goods and services it was perhaps easier to organize the illegal brokerage 
between in-plan and market prices this way; maybe it was considered less risky or less 
unethical than letting the enterprises bribe the officials directly to get low output 
quotas and high input quotas.56 Whatever the detailed institutional arrangement, it is 
not surprising that extensive corruption evolved from a situation where two prices for 
the same good would have to arise in a large share of the economy.57  
 
 Li (1999, 2001) constructs more precise explanations in two models where he studies 
the interaction between the out-of-plan markets for intermediate inputs and outputs 
and the corresponding plan procurement. He then applies them for estimating the size 
of real income diverted to corruption. The models are inspired by  Shleifer and 
Vishny’s (1993) analysis of corruption. Li ‘s major results fit seemingly well with 
theirs, but his models simulate a more complex situation. He assumes that officials are 
able to set output and input quotas so they may maximize their own (irregular 
income). They have, however to keep a given share of the procured output58 within 
the plan and hand it out to final consumers at plan prices. A given, but in general 
different share of the procured intermediate inputs has to be handed out to the 
enterprises at plan prices. As mentioned, in addition to the planned allocations, 
markets were opened for both output and intermediate inputs. The market for output 
                                                 
56 Since MSB was allowed to sell a in-plan good to a recognized distributing agency enterprise for a 
small mark-up (5%)  a low-risk procedure was to set up a chain of such “briefcase” enterprises (all 
controlled by MSB officials) where the last one sold the good at full market price. It was then  
registered as a market, not an in-plan input (Li 2002b). 
57That  regulating arrangements that lead to  two prices for  the same goods also leads to corruption is 
well-known from a large number of situations. Zoning policies is a striking case where corruption has 
been observed in most countries. 
58 The share could be made endogenous in the model without changing results, Li claims. 
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were partly supplied by the procurement officials – the share of   quotas that they 
didn’t have to keep within the plan – and by the enterprises – the part of output not 
grabbed by the officials’ procurement. In one model no agent had market power.  The 
situation regarding intermediate input was quite symmetrical except that the 
enterprises themselves constituted the demand side in the market.  Market prices were 
assumed to be above plan prices, as they were in fact.  Procurement officials would 
now seek to get as high procurement quotas with as small plan obligations as possible. 
However, by increasing the output quota the officials would push the market price 
down. This price decrease, however, also limits the profit the official may get from 
diversion. Hence, the competition between officials and enterprise managers both 
limits the size of the bribes and increases production compared to a situation where 
they collude. As in the Shleifer and Vishny (1993) model of bribery without theft, an 
increase in in-plan prices reduces diversion (bribes) but unlike it, leaves the market 
price undisturbed. Their collusion leads back to the Shleifer-Vishny situation as 
portrayed by Li.  A further restraint was that larger quotas implied a higher risk of 
been discovered in supplying the market illegally. Without going into details of the 
different results, we may note that the Shleifer and Vishny result that plan officials 
would gain by lower in-plan prices is recaptured by Li (2001, table 2). Moreover, it is 
quite robust and applies in both market settings outlined in Li (2001). He argues that 
the total amount gained by corrupt officials would be less in the dual track system 
than in the pure planning system outlined by Shleifer and Vishny where enterprise 
managers and officials collude. 
 
 This is, as far as I can see, misleading. Under central planning officials were not in 
fact seeking lower prices as pointed out by Harrison and Kim. The Shleifer-Vishny  
assumption that market demand functions existed and that officials could play on 
them to gain their bribes,  was simply quite unrealistic for the heydays of central 
planning, at least regarding for intermediate inputs.  The Chinese economy when the 
dual track system played an important role, is another story. Here markets were a 
clear reality, and Li’s models appear to be of obvious relevance.  
 
Equally important, having access to detailed accounts of a set of  769 state enterprises 
for a number of  years, Li was able to make assessments of  the empirical relevance of 
this form of corruption (or flow of embezzlement). The information from the accounts 
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could  be used in estimating market price –plan price ratios and their change during 
the 1980s.  Combing this with   input-output tables for China from 1987, Li (2003) 
could make empirical estimates of the size of corruption gained from the state 
enterprises, and its movement during the 1980s. He found it increasing as the market 
and plan prices diverged more strongly during the 1980s. From this source, the 
procurement administration, estimated corruption increased from 1.9% of GDP in 
1985 to 9.1% in 1989.59 
 
  As mentioned, the dual-track system is at present not an important part of the 
Chinese economic system any longer. Bribery collected through it cannot, 
accordingly, be any important part of the Chinese elite’s  present economic rewards. 
But how come that the WBI index indicates that corruption is ‘perceived’ to have  
significantly (Kaufmann et al, 2005) increased since that system went down the 
historical drain?   
While it covers only a particular historical episode in one, but important country’s  
move away from central planning, Li’s  study has given quantitative precision to the 
impression that  corruption has been  an important  economic phenomenon under the 
transition.. It contributes to the small, but increasing number of studies that study 
corruption empirically without relying on conceptually fuzzy index numbers 
otherwise applied in econometric analyses of the causes and consequences of 
corruption. Moreover, his model explanations tie up with  Shleifer and Vishny’s 
models of corruption and shortage. Hence it may in one sense  round up my overview 
of some of the mechanisms at work that may have brought  corruption and growth 
issues together in countries undergoing rapid, institutional change. 
 
On the other hand, the question about corruption- growth nexus raises a number of 
unanswered questions in Li’s research. He has demonstrated a mechanism that has 
transferred significant resources away from stagnant state enterprises at the same time 
as they were allowed to survive. But what did these officials do with their illegal 
income? Did they move into private business? And later: If Li’s analysis is correct, 
the economic effects of the allocation officials’ loss of their illegal source of income 
                                                 
59 He estimated corrupt diversion of enterprise income to be 40% of their value added and 60% of 
profits. If true, the question then arises whether these enterprises could have been so ineffective and 
unprofitable as they are generally assumed to be. Although receiving little in-plan inputs and  extensive 
output quotas, the enterprise could borrow if profits turn negative.  
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should be considerable. Did they accept lower proceeds from their official positions, 
but then started more private business on aside? Or did they move out of government 
altogether?  What kind of elite transition did in fact occur?  -  I am not aware of  any 
follow-up of Li’s research in these directions, however, directions important for a 
study the growth consequences of this particular mechanism of corruption. Li himself 
argues that since the dual track system should  generate less corruption than the 
Shleifer- Vishny centralized corruption model, the dual track system allowed more 
growth.  
 
Since I  cannot see that  the Shleifer-Vishny model of centralized corruption in fact 
was  so relevant for central planning  as well as for most of the transitions in the FSU-
countries (but where  their decentralized corruption model may well apply) I also find  
Li’s argument  about the higher growth rate in China not so convincing. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The focus of this article has been on corruption – and partly growth - in  former 
socialist countries  the first years after their central planning apparatuses have been 
dismantled. The underlying question raised was why one in some countries could 
experience rapid economic growth and in other rapid decline at the same time as 
perceived rates of corruption appear to have increased everywhere? The difference 
was so dramatic that it is difficult to see how it could be explained within a regular n-
country cross-section econometric approach in the manner of Treisman ( 2000, 2003). 
With this form of econometric approach one has to assume that the same mechanism 
is at work everywhere. An even if one reaches the conclusion that a given 
econometric specification  also fits the transition countries as Treisman (2003) does, 
one may question whether one may reach a satisfactory explanation that way when 
most institutional and economic interactions are cut away.  Should one not rather look 
for a number of  different, specific mechanisms at work, some influential in all the 
countries concerned,  but some at work in only a few? Or so I argue. 
 
 Here I have surveyed a few such mechanisms, emphasizing mechanisms that may tie 
the growth - corruption experiences in the early transitions to either some of the 
characteristics of the planned economy or to the situation at the point of time when 
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markets started to rule as the major institution to supply coordination devices and 
incentives for the economic agents.  Less attention has been given to the specifics of 
the post –transition change in institutions and policies, including their speed. The 
exception is the Chinese dual-track experience, and then mostly for no better reason 
than  it has been exceptionally well studied. 
 
 The impact from the rules, behavior patterns and norms that applied to the planned 
economy could either be through their continued presence or their absence and the 
subsequent adaptation. The adaptations could either consist in adaptations to their 
absence or as a consequence of their continued presence in the new institutional 
mixes. Here the situations may vary between the countries. The Communist Party was 
present and ruling in China after the transition point, but had lost power in the FSU 
countries. Adaptations to this situation had important consequences both for the 
subsequent growth and corruption experience in both areas. Another example: Old 
forms of tax official – enterprise behavior patterns established in the planned 
economy made it difficult to collect taxes when the income of the enterprises 
hardened, causing increased corruption in tax administration itself as well as corrupt, 
private taxation elsewhere, when the collective tax base eroded. While more 
pronounced in the FSU countries, the effect could also be seen in China. 
 
Survivals of restrictive, socialist norms about the proper scope for market transactions 
may have caused the increase in perceived  corruption independent of the subsequent 
growth – corruption experience. Norms about collective property rights may cause 
privatization to be perceived as embezzlement. Again we see how the old system is 
likely to have had strong impact on the level of corruption as perceived by the 
indigenous populations. And so we could go on. 
 
The mechanisms emphasized here are only a selection. Many others have been 
proposed in the literature and should have been spelled out in a complete survey.  This 
is not surprising given the myriad of changes and plausible, possible mechanisms at 
work during the transitions likely to have impact on such ‘sponge’ variables  - 
variables that soak up so many neighborhood processes and influences - as corruption 
and GDP. 
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While maybe only a matter of language, it appears unreasonable when the leading 
approach to empirical governance research may claim that there appears to be no 
traceable effect of the socialist system on corruption in the areas which it ruled  only a 
decade after its demise (Treisman, 2003) , but at the same time shows  that the 
mortality rates among European settlers more than a centennial ago may be of great 
significance to present corruption and growth rates (Acemoglu et al, 2001), although 
the statistical reasons for using these mortality rates as an instrument variable are 
strong.  The survey of mechanisms and facts presented here, should indicate, 
however, some of the many ways a recent past may impact the present even when 
most economic arrangements and normative ideas about them appear to have abruptly 
changed. 
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